Flash Report - Equity / Global

Will Uber's bid for GrubHub deliver for e-commerce in emerging markets?

  • The marriage between ride hailing and food delivery is made in heaven
  • Food delivery apps in EM hold a treasure trove of information
  • EM e-commerce is on the rise, but watch out for the cash burn

Though the crisis brought on by Covid-19 has brought misery for many, it has been a godsend for the food delivery business. There has been a surge in demand for meal delivery during lockdowns.

Uber Technologies Inc. (UBER US), the ride-hailing behemoth, is about to make an all-share bid for Grubhub, the food delivery company, according to media reports. Uber would integrate Grubhub (GRUB US), which is valued at US$4.5 billion. Under the terms reported in the Wall Street Journal, Grubhub shareholders would receive 2.15 Uber shares for each share. Grubhub rose 29% on the news. Uber was up 2%.

Uber has its own food delivery arm – Uber Eats. DoorDash Inc is the market leader in the US with 35% share and is also the fastest growing. Grubhub and Uber Easts are in second and third, both in terms of market share and growth.

Figure 1: Food delivery market share in US (%)

Source: Statista.com

This deal is a pathbreaker in the post Covid-19 world. EM Investors would be well-served to heed the following lessons:

(1) The marriage between ride-hailing and food delivery is a match made in heaven.

It is hard to find two businesses with a more compelling reason to collaborate. Just as food delivery has boomed, ride-hailing has collapsed. Uber's rides were down 80% in April, ravaging Uber's core business. It recorded US$2.9 billion of net losses in 1Q20, with writedowns in its EM investments. 

Even after global lockdowns ease, there is likely to be ongoing aversion to social gatherings and working from the office. Social distancing could linger for many months and potentially years. A permanent shift to widespread home working would vastly reduce the need to hail rides. 

In contrast, food delivery has become almost a necessity in lockdown, and the need for many months of social distancing could increase demand further. 

There are vast differences in profitability. Ride-hailing burns cash in the hope of growth. Uber has never been profitable and has lost more money than any transport company in the world. GrubHub has been profitable for the past three years. 

But, there is much replication of technology and manpower between the industries. Both have vast databases of customer addresses and preferences. Both have drivers that are motivated and paid through similar types of incentives. An alliance between the two industries seems a natural fit. 

In emerging markets there are dominant ride-hailing companies that are ripe for an alliance with fledging food delivery players. 

Table 1: Select EM ride-hailing and food delivery players

Ride Hailing

Food Delivery

IndiaUber, Ola, Saavari Car Rentals, CarzonrenetSwiggy, Foodpanda, Zomato
ChinaDidi, Yidao, Shenzhou ZhuancheEle.me, Meituan Waiman, Enjoy
IndonesiaGrab, Go-JekKlik-Eat, Gorry Gourmet, Kulina
Sub-Saharan AfricaUber, Bolt, inDriver (Taxify) Jumia Food, Uber Eats, Yum Deliveries
MENAUber, CareemMathaqi, Zomato, Careem Now, Deliveroo
Source: Tellimer

(2) Food delivery apps in EM hold a treasure trove of information

Online food delivery is at a nascent stage in EM. The players are dispersed, without dominant players with the scale of the American companies. China is the most advanced market in this regard. The principal players in China are Ele.me and Meituan. International players such as Zomato have made advances in Mena and Asean. 

However, the great virtue of these businesses is not just their cashflow generation or revenue growth. They also provide ride-hailing and EM e-commerce with vast data on consumer choice. 

Grubhub has positioned itself as a digital marketplace. It connects customers to restaurants across many platforms. It has over 110,000 restaurant partnerships in 2,000 American cities, with about 18mn diners as users. Grubhub and its peers have data on eating habits, dietary patterns, addresses and consumer trends. 

(3) EM E-Commerce is in the ascendancy, but watch the cash burn

In the post-Covid-19 world, the market will be far less forgiving of cash-burning e-commerce ventures. 

The food delivery businesses are less depletive of cash than mainstream E-commerce players. Grubhub has been cashflow positive for the past three years, as are other players such as DoorDash. They do not have to procure and store inventory like a retailer, and their products are perishable and quickly consumed. Cash collection is also better. Watch out for more action in this space in the new paradigm. 

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Flash Report / United States of America

Uber's appetite for food delivery will go beyond Postmates deal

  • Uber has acquired food delivery rival Postmates for US$2.7bn
  • The deal touches the top of the valuation range for the industry at 6x EV/Sales
  • We expect more food delivery acquisitions in emerging markets by Western giants
Nirgunan Tiruchelvam @
Tellimer Research
7 July 2020

Yesterday, Uber announced an all-share US$2.7bn acquisition of food delivery player Postmates, which will merge with Uber Eats, Uber's food delivery arm. The deal comes shortly after Uber failed to acquire another competitor, Grubhub, which was instead acquired by Just Eat Takeaway, the market leader in Europe, for US$7.3bn.

The Postmates deal is valued at 6x EV/Sales, according to our estimates. The combined Uber Eats-Playmates entity would control 37% of the US food delivery market. It would place Uber (the parent company) just behind the market leader Grubhub (45% market share).

The latest deal has significance well beyond the developed markets of the US and Europe:

  1. The Covid-19 pandemic has increased the attraction of food delivery businesses. While the typical valuation in the industry has ranged from 3-5x P/Sales, at 6x EV/Sales, Uber is demonstrating its hunger for scale in this business.

  2. UberEats has lost 30 cents for every dollar of business in the last three years. Massive cash burn is common in the industry across Developed and Emerging Markets, with only few, such as Meituan-Dianping in China, generating operating profits. However, the market leaders in the West and China have the cash for acquisitions in the fledgling markets and at the same time, loss-making players are looking to increase scale and eventually turn around.

  3. We can therefore expect a series of acquisitions in emerging markets, where revenues are growing even as companies burn cash. We think investors would be well-served to pursue food delivery opportunities in Nigeria, Indonesia, Kenya, Vietnam and Pakistan.

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Global Themes / Brazil

WhatsApp Brazil’s digital payments launch changes the game in emerging markets

  • WhatsApp and Facebook payments services have access to 3.0bn active customers, dwarfing other digital payments platforms
  • The move mirrors the convergence of payments, messaging and commercial services we have seen in several Asian markets
  • Africa's telco-led digital payments model seems safe for now, due to high financial exclusion and fragmented regulations
Rahul Shah @
Tellimer Research
17 June 2020

Facebook-owned WhatsApp’s launch of its payments app in Brazil brings a potentially powerful new entrant to the global digital payments scene, one with a 2.0bn ready-made active user base (and access to an aggregated 3.0bn users within the Facebook family’s suite of products).

‘Facebook family’ monthly active users (bn)

Source: Company data, Tellimer Research. Note: Facebook family includes users of Facebook, Instagram, FB Messenger and WhatsApp.

This development mirrors the increasing convergence of messaging and payments we have seen in several Asian markets (notably WeChat Pay in China), represents a potential threat to the telco-led digital payments model that has dominated in Africa (notably Kenya’s MPesa) and follows-on from the launch of Facebook Pay in developed markets last November.

How will the app work in Brazil?

WhatsApp currently has 120mn customers in Brazil, making the country its second-largest market after India. WhatsApp payment transactions will be free to consumers but, according to TechCrunch, business owners will pay a 4% fee. This seems steep compared to M-Pesa's 0.5% charge to business owners in Kenya, bKash’s 1% charge (Bangladesh), Easypaisa’s c2% fee (Pakistan) and Visa/ Mastercard’s c1% interchange fee.

Currently, users need to link their payment accounts to a Visa/ Mastercard credit or debit card. Banco do Brasil, Nubank and Sicredi have been named as the initial partners (but we believe other banks will follow), while payments processor Cielo will also provide support. Over time, we think a service that does not require a user’s credit/debit card to be linked could be developed, to broaden the appeal of the service and bring in financially and digitally-excluded customers (this has been one of Facebook’s stated global goals, via its internet.org initiative, for example).

The service will link with the WhatApp business app, which allows small business owners to catalogue their products and services. WhatsApp has noted that there are around 10mn SMEs in the country. Peer-to-peer payments are also possible.

The launch of WhatsApp Pay could negatively impact some listed names, such as e-Commerce providers PagSeguro and Mercado Libre, if SMEs can bypass their platforms and transact directly with WhatsApp’s larger customer base. StoneCo, the cloud-based technology platform, could also be affected. Over the longer-term, as WhatsApp payments is launched across other markets (as per Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg’s comments earlier this year), there is also the real prospect of the platform having a meaningful impact on the global remittances industry.

Telcos seem ill-equipped to put up a challenge in Brazil’s digital payments space

With high levels of internet penetration in Brazil, widespread use of cards for digital payments and banks’ investments in agency networks, telcos have lagged banks in providing access to digital payments.

Telefonica’s Vivo, the telco market leader, announced in November 2019 that it was piloting Vivo Money, a service offering personal loans of BRL1,000-30,000 (roughly US$200-US$6,000) provided by Banco Digio and offered in partnership with digital lender Ibi Digital. Telecom Italia’s TIM Brazil has also signaled its intention to launch financial services by the end of 2020, in partnership with online lender C6 Bank. América Móvil's Claro Brasil announced a partnership to offer personal loans to pre-approved customers through Banco Inbursa Brasil.

However, with these initiatives at their maiden stages and being more lending-focused, together with the emergence of WhatsApp payments, we think it is unlikely that telcos will play a significant role in the development of the Brazilian digital payments sector.

India is likely to also be on the agenda for WhatsApp's payments service

India is WhatsApp's largest market, with 400mn registered users. For the past few years, the firm has been working on a payments service that would plug into the Unified Payments Interface, in conjunction with a range of banks such as State Bank of India, ICICI Bank, HDFC Bank, and Axis Bank.

Recent Techcrunch data places Google Pay as the market leader in Indian digital payments, followed by PhonePe and then Paytm. (Incidentally, we note that Paytm has moved in the opposite direction to WhatsApp, starting as a payments firm and then adding messaging functionality). However, none of these three platforms are comparable to Whatsapp in terms of the size of the user base. We estimate that the vast majority of India’s c500mn smartphone users have the Whatapp application on their phones.

We think the delay in Whatsapp’s roll-out in India may relate to regulatory difficulties. One of the key attractions for users of WhatsApp is its end-to-end encryption, which protects privacy but has drawn the ire of several governments, including India’s. WhatsApp has also come under fire for helping to spread false rumours, in some instances with fatal consequences.

However, the market clearly remains of interest to Facebook, as evidenced by its US$5.7bn investment earlier this year in Jio, the disruptive telecoms firm controlled by Mukesh Ambani.

What about Indonesia?

WhatsApp indicated last year that it was ready to launch a payments service in Indonesia and was looking for local partners (since digital payments operators can only be 49% foreign-owned).

Indonesia is Facebook’s fourth-largest market after India, Brazil and the US, and WhatsApp has over 100mn customers in the country. The firm’s interest in this market was confirmed with its recent investment in ride-hailing and delivery firm Gojek, a move that may give access to the industry-leading Go-Pay digital wallet. Provision of payments functionality to the firm’s users (whether on the Facebook or WhatsApp platforms) would immediately broaden the firm’s commercial opportunities in the country.

How does WhatsApp payments stack up against the global competition?

An obvious proxy for WhatsApp payments is WeChat Pay. Tencent-owned WeChat is a large messaging service with c1.2bn users. WeChat Pay has 800mn users and 50mn active merchants accepting payments. A key differentiator with WhatsApp is that WeChat has created its own ecosystem, using mini-programs, so that users do not need to leave the app to make use of a wide range of services such as ride-hailing, gaming, e-commerce and so on. China’s Alipay, with over 1.2bn users globally, has also created its own network of integrated products and services; over 80% of Alipay’s customers use at least three financial products from the company (ranging from payments, wealth management and insurance to loans)

However, outside of China, Facebook and WhatsApp are the clear dominant players in the messaging space.

Taking a broader view of the competitor space, and considering revenues rather than customers, Facebook is dwarfed by several players that are also looking to play in the digital payments arena.

Annual revenues for Facebook and selected peers (US$bn)

Source: Company data, GSMA, Tellimer Research

Low internet penetration and fragmented regulations will allow telcos to continue dominating in Africa

Turning to one of the financial inclusion success stories of the last decade, we note that Africa telcos have taken the lead in offering digital payments, anchored to the SIM toolkit. To bypass the issue of low internet penetration, these services have largely been delivered via USSD (ie text-based) rather than through applications.

GSMA estimates the number of internet users in Sub Saharan Africa to be 271mn. The potential scale of WhatsApp payments in Africa thus dwarfs current mobile money subscriber bases such as Safaricom's 25mn M-Pesa users, Airtel Africa’s 18mn and MTN Group’s 31mn MoMo subscribers. The ubiquity of the messaging service and the continued decline in the cost of smartphone devices make WhatsApp a potential disruptor for mobile payment services; it is the most dominant app across the vast majority of sub-Saharan Africa.

A successful launch of WhatsApp payments in Africa would likely require partnering with a bank with extensive cross border operations (such as Attijariwafa, EcoBank, Equity Bank Standard Bank or UBA) to service the largest possible number of customers across the continent in one go. Another option could be to work with the best financial sector partners on a market-by-market basis. However, neither of these options addresses the issue of Africa's low banking penetration. A third, albeit less lucrative, route would be for WhatsApp to partner with telcos, charging them for integrating their mobile money payments into the WhatsApp platform.

More broadly, we think that due to the generally low levels of financial access on the continent and the vast array of different regulatory frameworks, a pan-African digital payments network will not be easy to realise, particularly in the near-term. We therefore do not see much of a threat from this development for Africa telcos and their digital wallets.

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Flash Report / Brazil

WhatsApp Brazil's payments roll-out hits a regulatory roadblock

  • Central bank, competition authority cite monopoly and pricing concerns, particularly given Cielo’s dominant position
  • WhatsApp taken by surprise. Stresses the open nature of its payments platform but may need to re-work its local strategy
  • We think the forthcoming launch of the central bank’s PIX instant payments system could have influenced its decision
Rahul Shah @
Tellimer Research
25 June 2020

With parent Facebook facing a growing advertiser backlash, Whatsapp’s own business plans have also been dealt a severe setback. After experiencing protracted delays to its Indian payments plans (where it has c400mn customers), WhatsApp last week debuted its payments platform in its second-largest market, Brazil. However, the Banco Central do Brasil has suspended this initiative and asked Visa and Mastercard to halt payments through the WhatsApp platform. The central bank indicated that its ‘motivation for the decision is to preserve an adequate competitive environment, which ensures the functioning of an interoperable, fast, secure, transparent, open and inexpensive payment system’. It also cited concerns regarding data privacy.

In addition, CADE, the competition authority, has suspended WhatsApp’s payments partnership with Cielo, due to the latter’s high market share of the card payments business in Brazil, and WhatsApp’s huge (120mn+) customer base in the country. The authority noted that such a partnership ‘would be difficult to create or replicate by Cielo's competitors, especially if the agreement under investigation involves exclusivity between them. In any case, it is evident that the WhatsApp user base provides a very large potential for transactions that Cielo could explore in isolation, depending on the way the operation was designed'.

To ease regulators' concerns, we think WhatsApp will stress the open nature of the payments platform (perhaps by making adjustments to the business model) and the broader economic benefits, particularly to lower-income/ financially excluded individuals and businesses. ‘Our goal is to provide digital payments to all WhatsApp users in Brazil using an open model and we will continue to work with local partners and the Central Bank to make this possible,’ WhatsApp said.

Alternatively, the firm may take the same route it has taken in Indonesia, and partner with a local entity that has already achieved regulatory clearance. Brazil already has a vibrant payments fintech scene from which it could choose; we estimate that c30% of all fintechs in the country have a payments focus.

We think at least part of the reason for the regulators' reticence is that the central bank’s PIX digital payments system is due to launch in November. PIX has two notable features: it will allow transactions to clear directly within around 10 seconds; and transactions will not need to go through an intermediary (such as a bank) but will instead clear directly using the central bank’s immediate payments system (SPI). This environment could provide a significant growth kicker to the local fintech scene, as it should lower transaction costs and be more accessible to financially-excluded segments of the population.

The Brazilian central bank's instant payments system

Source: Central Bank

If a dominant payments platform were to emerge before PIX is launched then its development could prove redundant. Again, WhatsApp has already sought to assuage the central bank’s concerns in this area: ‘We support the Central Bank’s PIX project on digital payments and together with our partners are committed to work with the Central Bank to integrate our systems when PIX becomes available’.

Ultimately, we think WhatsApp will find a way to operate its payments platform in Brazil, and its other target markets such as India, Indonesia and Mexico. But its launch delays, particularly relative to that of Facebook Pay (November 2019 in the USA), highlight the additional challenges companies face when operating in emerging markets.

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Equity Analysis / Nigeria

Nigeria E-Commerce: The route to profit for ride-hailing and food delivery

  • The food delivery business in developing countries is booming, but will struggle to generate profits and cashflow
  • As the food delivery battle intensifies, the cash burn in EM e-commerce may spur acquisitions and a move to efficiency
  • Investors should identify the firms with the strongest cash sustainability prospects
Nirgunan Tiruchelvam @
Tellimer Research
26 May 2020

Online food delivery volumes have skyrocketed during the lockdown in Nigeria, with a more than 50% increase in the items sold on Jumia Food between 2 March and 27 April. Restaurants are shut to diners, meaning stranded and isolated households have few alternatives but to sample online food delivery. 

There has also been a surge of interest from ride-hailing giants in the fledging food delivery industry. Ride-hailing volumes have collapsed, and a shotgun marriage between the two industries with contrasting Covid-19 fortunes seems imminent.

Earlier this month, Uber Technologies Inc. (UBER US), the ride-hailing behemoth, made an all-share bid for Grubhub, the US food delivery company. If successful, Uber would merge Grubhub (GRUB US) – which is valued at US$4.5 billion – with its own food delivery arm, Uber Eats. Grubhub shareholders would receive 2.15 Uber shares for each share.

Food delivery in Nigeria 

In developing markets, the food delivery industry has particular issues to address. In this article we concentrate on the state of the industry in Nigeria, Africa's largest market. Though food delivery is the poor cousin of both e-commerce and ride-sharing in Nigeria, the industry now has revenue of nearly US$496m, yet it barely existed until five years ago.

The Nigerian market is led by Jumia, Africa's answer to Amazon. This e-commerce platform has a dedicated unit (Jumia Food) that has c50% market share in food delivery. Homegrown competitors include Ofadaa and Areachops.

Jumia Food has about 1 million customers spread across 30 African cities. In Lagos it has 4,000 restaurants including local leaders and chains such as KFC, Pizza Hut and McDonald's. 

Jumia Foods has the logistics to complete a delivery in 45 minutes in Nigeria, and it delivers fresh food as well as prepared meals. According to the management discussion in 1Q2020 results, there has been a surge in demand for its services after Covid-19. Other platforms have shown a similar rise.

Source: Statista.com

Could the marriage between Uber and Grubhub be replicated in Nigeria, with the country's ride-hailing leaders – such as Bolt – teaming up with food delivery companies? As with all potential tie-ups, there are opportunities and pitfalls. Investors should be mindful of the following:

(1) Food may be being delivered, but not profits... yet

Food delivery is an intrinsically unprofitable business, as it lacks the network effect. Though it is projected as a tech business, the scale economics that drive e-commerce and ride-sharing are elusive. The network effect occurs when the value of using the platform for each user rises as more users enter the platform. 

Unlike Uber, which thrives with the expanding network of riders, food delivery companies are body shops. A typical delivery person can only make about two deliveries per hour. 

According to Bloomberg consensus, GrubHub’s revenue may rise by a third by FY2022, but it may not generate positive cashflow from operations. It may be able to deliver food, but it will be a long time before it delivers profits.

Similarly, Food Jumia has seen its usage rise sharply in 1Q2020. But as far as we can tell, it does not seem to be profitable yet. The vast distances and stifling traffic of urban Nigeria means that the average deliveryman can only make a single delivery per hour. The economics are even more onerous, and if Food Jumia cannot turn a profit in a lockdown, it may never do so.

(2) Predatory pricing in Nigeria is a problem

Jumia Food now works with restaurants to offer relatively cheap meals. The typical pricing is in the range of US$4-5 per meal. This is an estimated 15% less than the 2018 average. The average user orders about six times a month, across the platform.

However, Jumia Food and its peers seem to have adopted a predatory pricing policy. They charge independent restaurants as much as 20% of an order, according to our estimates. This dilutes the profits of Nigeria's independent restaurants, and may not be sustainable.

(3) Nigeria's food delivery growth may plateau 

The total size of Nigeria's food delivery business may triple from US$172m in 2017 to US$465m in 2020. The drivers are the discounts that Food Jumia has been procuring for customers. But we expect this growth trajectory to flatten in 2020-24 as the business becomes unsustainably cash negative. 

There are two categories in the field – platform-to-customer delivery and restaurant-to-customer delivery. Food delivery platforms are not interested in following the Netflix model and expanding their own ‘content’ (ie in-house meal production). But restaurants recognise the merits of using platforms like Food Jumia. Given these dynamics, we expect the restaurant-to-consumer segment to outnumber platform-to-consumer delivery by a factor of 2 to 1 by 2024.

The main focus for growth is likely to be on the volume front rather than average revenue per user (ARPU), as ARPU is almost flat. Nigerian food delivery ARPUs are less than a fifth of the corresponding level in China, where food delivery and online payments are far more advanced.

Source: Statista.com

Source: Statista.com

(4) Food delivery would worsen EM e-commerce cash burn 

EM e-commerce is on the rise, but in the Covid-19 era the rate of cash burn in the industry could come under greater scrutiny. Unfortunately, the food delivery business could actually increase the cash burn of EM e-commerce. Amazon turned the corner in terms of cashflow from operations in FY2001 through judicious working capital management. It was able to renegotiate its procurement arrangements. The food delivery cash burn may encourage Jumia and its peers to adopt similar measures. A further scenario could be an acqusition of the fledging e-commerce players in markets such as Nigeria by major global companies such as Alibaba and Amazon. 

Such an eventuality may encourage a rapid alliance between food delivery and ride-hailing. The two industries both have a need to arrest their respective cash burn. There is a replication of infrastructure in terms of technology and operating expenses, and both businesses depend on an army of foot soldiers (drivers and delivery workers) to buttress a technology platform. There is also the attraction of pooling customer information, as both segments have a treasure trove of data on customer behaviour. 

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Flash Report / Germany

Wirecard bankruptcy could be a Lehman moment for e-commerce

  • Though the immediate financial exposure is limited, the fraud has reputational liability for EM e-commerce
  • Investors will increase their focus on the cash generation in EM e-commerce and the sanctity of the cash balances
  • We are still bullish on EM e-commerce such as JMIA US, MELI US and SEA US
Nirgunan Tiruchelvam @
Tellimer Research
25 June 2020

Wirecard, the German-listed payments giant, declared insolvency today. The collapse comes close on the heels of the disclosure that US$2.1bn was missing from its balance sheet. The company had drawn on almost all of its credit lines in the last few days and the previous CEO, Markus Braun, has been arrested. Further arrests of Wirecard personnel seem imminent.

This is the first ever bankruptcy of a member of the elite DAX Index of blue-chip German companies. It also has immense implications for EM e-commerce. Wirecard is one of the principal lubricants of e-commerce, particularly in emerging markets.

What is the risk for e-commerce players?

Wirecard's customers include the principal e-commerce players. Its business model is heavily exposed to the e-commerce space in emerging Asia, with its customers including Grab, Tencent and Alibaba.

Unlike the Lehman bankruptcy in 2008, Wirecard does not carry principal exposure. Wirecard connects merchants with credit card companies, collecting a commission for assuring merchants of payment. 

For example, the EUR3.8bn that Wirecard claimed to have on its balance sheet in 3Q19 was accrued from retained earnings that were driven from these commissions. The actual payments are guaranteed by the credit card payment systems run by giants such as Visa and Mastercard.

Therefore, the risk for EM e-commerce players is more reputational than an immediate financial risk. Many EM e-commerce companies have already distanced themselves from Wirecard. Yesterday, Grab Holdings Inc., the leading ride-hailing firm in ASEAN, announced that it would be reviewing its relationship with Wirecard.

What it means for EM e-commerce valuations

EM e-commerce companies are burning a lot of cash. Revenue growth has come at the expense of the cash flow statement, but Wirecard's insolvency will raise the scrutiny of these companies' cash balances. EM e-commerce companies use credit card companies to collect payments, and payment providers, such as Wirecard, collect the cash from the credit card companies. Third parties that hold cash in trust are often used for this purpose. The fraud takes us to the heart of the EM e-commerce model, and now investors are much more inclined to check that heart is fit and healthy.

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